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Abstract: The debate of scholars in the field of international relations in last years has put the 
European Union’s role into the consideration. The European Foreign and Security Policy has 
positioned itself through its development to the constructive and normative line of research of world 
politics. With this respect, this article examines a character of crisis management of the European 
Common Foreign Policy based on the institutional development. Besides the European Union does 
not possess a unified foreign and security policy, regardless one army and single institutional 
mechanism, the recent crisis management actions have shaped the policies into a comprehensive 
nature. The paper overviews briefly the history of Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as 
Common Security and Defence Policy and focuses on crisis management of civilian and military 
missions. The author claims that the development has a significant impact on a character of crisis 
management analyzed from the institutional and financial capacities of the European Security and 
Defence Policy. Consequently, the character of crisis management performs complex mechanisms of 
responsive, political/administrative, legal, economic and human help to crisis-affected territories in 
the world. Respectfully, the character of crisis management has thus more pre-crisis nature of a 
resilience. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched more than thirty operations in 
crisis-affected territories, mainly in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. 
Consequently, the EU in the scope of world politics positioned itself as a security 
actor adopting the European Security Strategy (2003). With this respect, the EU 
has been carrying out several types of civilian and military missions (police and 
rule of law missions, border management missions, monitoring missions and 
peacekeeping missions). Although, the final categorization of a character of crisis 
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management is hard to adjust. Based on the work of James Sperling (2014), this 
paper will try to evaluate the outcomes of overall budgetary expenditures. “When 
the range of EU operations and missions conducted under the rubrics of crisis 
management is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the term has served the role of a 
uniting signifier for very different types of operations.” (Hynek, 2011, p. 86) 
Regarding the historical development, the crisis management is exposed by the 
paradigm of comprehensive crisis management (Hynek, 2011; Pirozzi, 2013; 
Pavlov, 2015) based on a provision of each mission and institutional structure of 
crisis management at the European level of governance. Other approaches 
underlying crisis management are based on classical paradigms of international 
relations like liberalism, structuralism, and realism (Pohl, 2013, p. 307). 
Exhaustion of topic of this paper does not allow to devote more space also for the 
main narratives of international relations so the paper deals with the constructive 
paradigm of normativeness of the EU in the world politics. Regarding this, the 
institutional structure of the crisis management after the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty has emphasized the pre-crisis management approach leading to the 
new paradigm of resilience. 
 
2 The Development of the European Crisis Management 
In early years of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1950, there was also an attempt to set up the European Defence Community known 
as the Pleven Plan. The Pleven Plan envisaged a formation of the common army 
and thus had an initiative to create the European Institute of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Gerbet, 2004, p. 99). Important in this case of the Pleven Plan was 
an effort to delegate powers of defense policy from the national to the 
supranational level, which was at that extremely ambitious (Dinan, 2014, p. 65). 
This plan, however, had failed because of the refusal of the French national 
parliament (in August 1954) caused by political instability of French Government. 
The consequence of French internal politics had been an interruption in the process 
of shaping the common foreign policy for decades. Therefore during this period, 
the security and defense policy remained as a competence of every Member state 
e.g. a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as a national 
policy of every member state. The area of security and defense policy was in fact 
characterized as “an international extension of domestic policies and problems” 
(Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 341). 
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The international relations in the 90s had a significant impact on the European 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The geopolitical changes in international 
relations which had made the United States of America (the USA) a leader in world 
politics and “successor” of the Cold War, helped the USA to ensure their position 
in security policy also in Europe by strengthening the NATO organization. 
Moreover, there had become an opportunity for former Soviet states to join the 
European Community which revived dynamics of the integration. In the early 90s, 
The European Community adopted the “Petersberg tasks” (1992) as part of the 
European Security and Defence Policy. For the first time, the Treaty included 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, tasks relating to the maintenance of peace and tasks 
of combat forces as a part of a crisis management (Bindi, 2010, p. 29). The EU 
intended to create the rapid reaction forces, which would be able to intervene in 
a crisis situation. Nonetheless, this kind of operations would require the United 
Nations and NATO mandate. The adoption of the Petersberg tasks has shown a 
willingness to deploy common military units, but the biggest problem were weak 
and inadequate ways and means of defense forces of most nationalities (Cameron, 
2007, p. 74). Bindi and Shapiro characterized this period of the creation of 
common security and defense policy as: “Eventually, the only result in the field of 
foreign policy was the so-called CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), 
which was actually an institutional “upgrade” of the EPC rather than a coherent 
foreign policy. The European failure to act decisively in the Balkans meant that the 
1990s were also the period in which the Europeans started talking seriously about 
defense. The results were similarly relatively weak institutions (the ESDP) rather 
than a true common defense policy” (Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 342). Foreign and 
security policy indeed became part of the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty 
(in 1992), but not under the exclusive competence of the EU, but was left entirely 
as a security competence of the Member States. 
Military conflicts that occurred at the end of the 20th century, such as the wars in 
territories of former states of the Socialist Federative republic of Yugoslavia had 
shown that the Member States could no longer cope with crises and conflicts in 
Europe without the implementation of common rules and a decision-making in the 
military field. Apparently, the direct involvement of the European Union and 
political pressure to establish the common security policy was caused by the fact 
that those conflicts occurred in Europe. Declaration of St. Malo (1998) declared 
that “the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. To this end, the EU must have the capacity for autonomous 
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action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity 
with our respective obligations to NATO” (Deighton, 2002, p. 725). On the basis 
of St. Malo declaration, negotiated primarily by France and the United Kingdom, 
was possible to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
Cologne a year later (1999). European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was an 
integral part of the European Foreign and Security Policy although they were two 
separate policies. “The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an 
integral part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which ‘shall 
include all questions related to the security of the Union’ (Article 17.1 TEU). The 
institutional frameworks of CFSP and ESDP broadly overlap, although the specific 
operational character of ESDP has triggered the creation of a distinctive subset of 
institutions primarily charged with the planning and conduct of crisis management 
operations.” (Grevi & Keohane, 2009, p. 19) 
Consequently, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) was launched in 2000 as an advisory body for the ESDP in the issues 
of crisis management. The body of the CIVCOM as the crucial and the most 
important policy of ESDP was composed of the representatives of Member states. 
Beside the intergovernmental nature of the CIVCOM, the Feira (Portugal) 
European Council (June 2000) managed to define the core civilian aspects of crisis 
management in the four priority areas: police; strengthening the rule of law; 
strengthening civilian administration and civil protection1 have become the main 
crisis management areas which also define a character of each mission’s 
management till today. Later, in 2004, were added two further areas, the 
monitoring and supporting EU Special Representatives (Chivvis, 2010, p. 6). 
Following the world affairs, security and defense changes after the 11th September 
2001, the EU and NATO implemented the Berlin Plus Agreements (December 
2002) to “govern relations between the EU and NATO in crisis management.” 
(Bindi, 2010, p. 37) The close ties between the EU and the North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation were visible even after the Berlin Plus Agreements which should 
clarify the process of organization management. As Keukeleire pointed out “The 
Berlin Plus arrangements were both pragmatic and symbolic: pragmatic because 
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the Europeans lacked the core equipment and logistics necessary to conduct major 
military operations within the ESDP framework, symbolic because it also 
institutionalized for many member states the essential interlinking of the EU with 
NATO.” (Keukeleire, 2010, p. 57)1 Shortly after the Berlin Plus, Agreements was 
launched the first civilian mission, the European Union Police Mission in Bosna 
and Herzegovina (EUPM) in January 2003. The important part of organization 
management of the EUPM was the first test of crisis management concepts, 
procedures, and instruments, but also the transition from the UN’s International 
Police Task Force in Bosnia (IPTF) (Juncos et al., 2007, pp. 47-48). The main 
objective of “the mission was to engage in mentoring, monitoring and inspecting 
activities (Merlingen, 2010, p. 164). Following the first police/civilian mission in 
Western Balkans, on 31 March 2003, the Operation Concordia (Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia) was launched as the first military operation of the ESDP. 
The mandate of the EUFOR Concordia was to “ensure the follow-on to NATO’s 
Operation Allied Harmony.” (Juncos et al., 2007, p. 134) Lately, in December 2004 
the EU launched its largest military mission, EU Force (EUFOR), Althea, taking 
over from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) (Juncos et al., 2007, p. 47). 
The overview on the first military and civilian/police missions is based on the 
assumption that the organization of crisis management relied on the previous 
operations of United Nations or the NATO. We can assume that the first missions 
of the ESDP thus played a role of complementary and supportive actions to the 
crisis management of other international security organizations.  
From the institutional perspective, in 2003 was adopted a document, known as the 
European Security Strategy, which carries out the ambition to be a core strategy for 
further changes of the foreign policy. However, as Bindi and Shapiro pointed out 
“creating a strategy document is not the same as having a strategy. The formulation 
of a security strategy is (or should be) a political process, an effort to build 
consensus around a broad approach to securing a polity’s interests. It is much more 
than just a document.” (Bindi & Shapiro, 2010, p. 343) Even the European Security 
Strategy was performed as a conceptual defence and security policy, the document 
brought “just” the definitions of global threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
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autonomously by making use of the operational headquarters of one of the member states or use 
NATO assets and capabilities. If it opts for the second alternative, the EU can ask for access to 
NATO’s planning facilities, can request that NATO make available a NATO European command 
option for an EU-led military operation, and can request the use of NATO capabilities.” (Keukeleire, 
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of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime)1, and 
the institutional framework. Nevertheless, after the implementation of the 
European Security Strategy and the performance of the European Security and 
Defence Policy after 2003, the number of civilian crisis actions has increased by 
the number of 17 ongoing missions2. “The ESS designated three strategic roles for 
the EU: providing regional security in the European neighborhood, satisfying the 
requirements of conflict and threat prevention, and enhancing the prospects for a 
rule-based, multilateral international order – captured by the aspiration to ‘effective 
multilateralism’ regionally and globally.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 598) the ESS 
introduced and developed the strategy of preventive engagement (Sperling, 2014) 
which could be considered as part of pre-crisis management mechanism.  
Lately, in 2007, the ESDP established a common strategy in the formation of rapid 
reaction forces known as “battlegroup”, which became the most important aspect 
of crisis management3. The creation of the European military rapid forces could be 
seen as a great step not even from the personal perspective of organizational 
management, but also from the prism of overcoming a “frozen” integration in 
ESDP. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty (2008) introduced a coherent coordination 
body (the European External Action Service/the EEAS), and also renamed the 
European Security and Defence Policy as the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)4 by which directed the foreign policy towards closer political 
integration. Nevertheless, “the Treaty of Lisbon both thoroughly modifies the 
institutional context of ESDP and introduces more specific innovations pertaining 
to this policy area as such.” (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009, p. 60) From the 
perspective of limitations of defense and security actions, the crisis management 
relies mostly on the personal cooperation with other international organizations. 
“All ESDP military operations, except Concordia, have taken place under a UN 
mandate. Aside from clear benefits at the political, operational and tactical level, 
good cooperation and coordination with these actors are also a key dimension of 
EU support to effective multilateralism” (Grevi,& Helly,& Keohane, 2009, p. 408). 
On one hand, the performance of crisis management depends on a personal 
assistance of NATO or UN, which personal capacities are trained concerning the 
aim of those organizations and the performance of the European military 
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3 “EU Battlegroups”. Available at 
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management could be considered as supportive. On the other hand, there is an 
option for non-military/civilian actions conducted by the EU. The next part of 
paper is dealing with the development of crisis management after the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. As will be analyzed bellow, the option to 
perform civilian missions has shaped into a developing institutionalization of 
civilian crisis management. 
 
3. Institutionalization of the European Crisis Management Policy after 
the Lisbon Treaty 
The European civil crisis management has been established based on the common 
foreign and security strategy and developed by the years of the European 
integration. Nevertheless, the European crisis management is a relatively new 
policy contributing to the common security structures. The civilian crisis 
management is an instrument of the international actors to help create the stability 
and secure regimes in countries which have a lack of those capabilities. From the 
geopolitical perception, it could be considered as one of the soft power tools how 
to identify the global actors in the processes of democratization or regime 
stabilization. As James Sperling pointed out, the common European security 
policies were developed by three principles: the solidarity, subsidiarity, and 
sovereignty (Sperling, 2014, p. 594). These three principles, prescribed by the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009), have made the ESDP as one of the new communitarian 
policies. On these principles, is also shaped the institutional framework of the 
European Security and Defence Policy. Regard to this perspective, the main point 
of the European Union civilian crisis management is that has been limited by the 
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (described above). The 
institutional basis lays on the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
established by the Lisbon Treaty and launched on 1 January 2011. As the European 
Union's diplomatic service, it helps the EU's foreign affairs chief – the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – carry out the Union's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy1. The High Representative as a chief of EU's 
foreign and security policy, known as the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' 
(CFSP) and the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' (CSDP), coordinates more 
than 140 delegations of the European Union worldwide. Because of the autonomy 
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of the EEAS1, from the perspective of a multilevel model of European governance, 
the High Representative (today Frederica Mogherini) is also the vice-president of 
the European Commission, chief of the European Council for foreign affairs, the 
political power of this position could be considered as more than influential. The 
formal leadership of the High Representative (Tallberg, 2006) in the civilian 
missions is constituted by the European law (the Lisbon treaty), but also 
accountable by a legitimate mandate of the informal role in the European foreign 
policy structures (Helwig, 2015, p. 89). In general, the EEAS is launching the 
civilian crisis management missions mainly in African and the Middle East 
territories2. These missions are held predominantly as a crisis management 
mechanism of conflict resolution under the directorate of Department for Crisis 
Response & Operational Coordination3. According to the official web page, the 
main task of the Office after the Lisbon Treaty is a coordination of the European 
initiatives in crisis response4.  
From the perspective of stabilization and a post-conflict management, in 1992, was 
proposed an initiative of the European Commission (Jacques Delors Commission) 
to create a mechanism for humanitarian aid and civil protection as a prevention of 
local conflicts. The European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) was 
established on the basis of solidarity to third countries and as a complementary 
institution to the international network of humanitarian aid, such as Red Cross, UN 
Agencies (ECHO Annual Report 2014, pp. 20-21). Since 2009, under a renewed 
name as The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department, has gained a mandate to a compliance policy of social, natural, and 
post-conflict reconciliation. With the annual budget of more than two billion euros, 
the ECHO humanitarian aid has made of the EU institutions the third biggest donor 
in the world (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, 2016, p. 31). The 
ECHO is run by Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management and 
operating today in more than 80 countries (ECHO Annual Report 2014, p. 4). In 
my view, the involvement of the ECHO as a part of a post-recovery management in 
affected countries would reflect the current needs of organizational management 
research. However, the ECHO is mostly dealing with the post-conflict, post-natural 
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2 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm. 
3 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/index_en.htm. 
4 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/index_en.htm. 
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disaster management, and has already developed its policies toward the support for 
the sustainability of regimes. For these purposes of civilian crisis management 
analysis, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department developed the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM). “The EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM) was in 2013 made up of 32 states (28 EU 
Member States plus the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway), which cooperated in the field of civil protection and 
was created to support their efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to natural or 
man-made disasters either within or outside of the EU. The assistance can take the 
form of in-kind assistance, equipment, and teams, or involve sending experts to 
carry out assessments. It relies on government resources and if assistance is 
required in countries outside the EU, it usually works in parallel with humanitarian 
aid. The operational heart of EUCPM is the Emergency Response Coordination 
Centre (ERCC) accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Any country inside 
or outside the EU affected by a disaster and overwhelmed by its magnitude can 
make an appeal for assistance through the ERCC.” (ECHO Annual Report 2013) 
With this respect, it could be assumed that the policies of the humanitarian aid and 
protection and the crisis management policies of the ESDP are mutual, even 
interconnected. Therefore, the values of crisis management provided by ECHO are 
based on a European solidarity towards third countries and also towards the 
internal affairs.  
The complex overview of the institutionalization of the EEAS and the ECHO 
mechanism could be considered as a part of the crisis and post-crisis management. 
Additionally, the new approaches to the responsiveness of the European crisis 
management suggest that “the EU crisis management does not start with crisis 
response, but with early warning and conflict prevention.” (Hynek, 2011, p. 86) 
Consequently, the ensuring a coherent response to crisis shows recent efforts of the 
European Union to built even the pre-crisis capacities “to turn the comprehensive 
approach into comprehensive action”1. Within the framework of the EEAS and the 
ECHO mechanisms, the EU recently started to develop a resilience crisis 
management as a part of pre-conflict/prevention crisis management. The policy 
tool of the EEAS, the EU Early Warning System (launched in 2011), is a risk 
management policy tool to stress a conflict situation. Directed by the policy of EU 
Comprehensive Approach to External Crises and Conflicts, the EU’s “goal is not a 
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prediction”1, but to address the warning system gap in crisis prevention. “The 
principle of preventive engagement (adopted by the European Security Strategy in 
2003) is directed towards the external milieu and has the overarching goals of 
developing effective civilian crisis management capabilities, contributing to 
regional stability, mitigating ongoing civil conflicts, and promoting civil liberties, 
the rule of law and democratic government.“ (Sperling, 2014, p. 599) It could be 
said that a good crisis management of the current crises in the world should be seen 
through the prism of a resilience management theory. As Braes and Brooks (2010) 
pointed out, the “resilience is neither a plan nor a checklist. The capacity for 
resilience is found in an organization’s culture, attitudes, and values.” (Braes & 
Brooks, 2010, p. 17) Even the resilience management is connected to the organism 
itself and came from the psychology studies of self-maintenance (Coutu, 2002), the 
European Union resilience management contributes as the external factor of 
resilience. The EU has been able to support the process of prevention of 
humanitarian crises by developing the comprehensive analysis. For this purpose, 
the European Commission has launched the Index of Risk Management (INFORM) 
in 2014 as a policy indicator for understanding the crises. The INFORM as the first 
global data set for a risk management is “a joint initiative of the European 
Commission and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team (IASC) for 
Preparedness and Resilience, in partnership with Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), World Bank, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), UN agencies, 
and many others.”2 The comprehensiveness of the INFORM dataset relies on the 
three dimensions (Hazard&Exposure, Vulnerability, and Lack of Coping 
Capacity), six categories (Natural, Human, Socio-economic, Vulnerable Groups, 
Institutional, Infrastructure) and seventeen components (Earthquake, DRR, 
Governance, Current Conflict Intensity, etc.)3. The preparedness of crisis 
management embodied in the INFORM analysis offers the EEAS a manual for 
response and resilience crisis management. For the long-term crisis management 
perspective, the INFORM performs an effective planning and pre-crisis 
management. Moreover, the future development and adoption of the INFORM 
                                                     
1Http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning
_en.pdf. 
2  Index for Risk Management-INFORM: Concept and Methodology, Version 2016. Publications 
Office, 2015. Available at 
http://www.inform.index.org/Portals/0/InfoRM/2016/INFORM%20Concept%20and%20Methodolog
y%20Version%202016%20updated%20cover.pdf. 
3 Ibid. 
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policy tool as a compliance to the EEAS and the ECHO policies would maintain 
a desirable proactive and reactive resilience management to deal with risks and 
threats (Braes & Brooks, 2010, p. 16).  
 
4. Analysis of Financial Capacities and their Impact 
The first precondition to effective crisis management is to adjust the financial 
capacities. The European Union for its security governance (between years 1997 to 
2013) contributed 7,61% of the overall budget which represents more than 151 
billion of euros (Table 1). Respectfully to the financial capacity of EU to provide 
the missions, there can be a dispute over the resources for the development of 
further actions. Besides military and human resources, the equipment of weapons 
suffers from a lack of financial sources (Sperling, 2014, p. 595). James Sperling 
(2014) categorized the security governance expenditure according to four policy 
areas: protection, assurance, prevention, compellence. The compellence is 
represented as direct military operations, the prevention represents the ESS strategy 
of “preventive engagement” and enlargement financial policy, the assurance is 
embodied as a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction of regimes, the 
protection is based on the strategy of border security and performs also the internal 
facilitation of judicial and police cooperation (Sperling, 2014, pp. 600-612). Based 
on Sperling analysis, we can track the increasing expenditures for the strategy of 
“preventive engagement” where the significant role plays civilian crisis 
management of development and humanitarian aid. With the overall share of 
almost 85%, the prevention budgetary expenditures show how much the EU is 
strengthening the non-military missions. “The tiny share of compellence 
expenditures merely reflects the intergovernmental basis of funding EU military 
operations; policies of assurance and protection have relatively low shares, owing 
to the dominance of national governments in the quest for internal security and the 
reliance upon seconded military, police and judicial authorities for the purpose of 
post-conflict state-building.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 600). 
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Table 1. Total expenditures on security governance, 1997–2013 (as share of 
Commission budget) 
 
Source: Sperling, J. (2014). The Eu as a Security Actor: Prevention, Protection, Assurance 
and Compellence in (Sperling Sperling (ed.) 2014, p. 600) 
The development of the EEAS actions to these days has shown two classifications 
of missions: completed and ongoing missions, military and civil missions (Table 
2). The division is constituted by a military presence at actions and thus categorizes 
them to the civilian-military operations and “pure” civilian missions. As Tables 2 
shows, the provision of civilian missions is prevailing over the military operations 
through the time with the share 22 to 12. Consequently, based on the development 
of the ESDP and personal capacities of European military capability analyzed 
above, the civilian missions dominate the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 
time.  
The Table 2 shows that the civilian missions are divided into few categories 
depends on a character of the action. There are prevailing the police missions 
(EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL 
Kinshasa in DRC, EUPOL RD Congo, EUPOL COPPS in Palestina, EUPOL 
Afghanistan), followed by the civil protection missions (AMIS EU, EUBAM 
Rafah, EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUCAP Nestor, 
EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya), the rule of law missions (EUJUST Themis, 
EUJUST Lex Iraq, EUPT Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo) and the monitoring/advisory 
missions (Aceh AMM, EUMM Georgia, EUAM Ukraine) (Table 2). Concerning 
the territorial division and the type of action perspective, there are cases such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African rep., Kosovo, Macedonia or 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EEAS has deployed several types of the 
missions. For instance, in Macedonia, there were carried out two types of missions, 
the military operation (Concordia FYROM in 2003) followed by the police and 
advisory mission (EUPAT FYROM in 2005). 
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Table 2. Overview of completed and ongoing military and civilian missions of 
European crisis management 
Eufor 
Concordia/Fyrom 
Eufor 
Tchad/Rca 
Eufor Althea Eunavfor 
Atalanta 
 
Civilian-
Military 
Missions 
Artemis Dr Congo Eufor Rca 
Central African 
Rep. 
Eunavfor Med Eutm Mali 
Eufor Rd Congo Amis Eumam Rca Eutm Somalia 
Eupol Kinshasa 
(Police Mission) 
Eupol Rd 
Congo (Police 
Mission) 
Eupol Copps 
(Police Mission) 
Eubam Rafah 
(Border 
Control) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civilian 
Missions 
Eupat 
Concordia/Fyrom 
(Police Advisory 
Team) 
Eujust Themis 
(Rule Of Law 
Mission) 
Eupol Afganistan 
(Civilian/Police) 
Eulex Kosovo 
(Rule Of Law) 
Amm (Aceh 
Monitoring 
Mission) 
Eupm (Police 
Mission) 
Eumm Georgia 
(Monitoring 
Mission) 
Eucap Nestor 
(Maritime 
Security 
Support) 
Eu Ssr Guinea-
Bissau (Civil-
Military) 
Eujust Lex 
(Rule Of Law) 
Eucap Sahel 
Niger(Police 
Training) 
Euam (Advisory 
Mission) 
Euavsec  (Airport 
Security Support) 
Eubam (Civil 
Protection) 
Eubam (Civil 
Protection) 
Eucap Sahel 
(Civil 
Protection) 
  Eusec Rd (Civil 
Protection) 
 
Completed Missions Ongoing Missions 
Source: Author’s Proceedings 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusion 
Regarding the quotation of Sperling that “nonetheless, the EU possesses the 
comparative diplomatic advantage of implementing long-term conflict prevention 
or peace-building measures than undertaking peacemaking or peace enforcement 
missions.” (Sperling, 2014, p. 612), this paper demonstrated the thesis by analyzing 
the historical performance, institutional development and financial relations to the 
crisis management. One of the conclusions based on historical circumstances is that 
the military missions are still provided by the cooperation with NATO, UN or is 
conducted by the Member States themselves either like complementary forces or 
like cooptation. This system of governance has not yet produced a clear division of 
labor between the EU and its member states, but it has gone beyond a system of 
governance where the EU and its member states simply govern the security 
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environment concurrently and in parallel (Ekengren et al., 2006, pp. 119-120). As 
was described, a number of civilian missions prevail over the military actions. This 
observation brings the analysis to the assumption that the European Union 
development of crisis management in defense policies is not under the common 
institutional decision-making body and the effectiveness of the provision of each 
mission depends on shared competencies of the European External and Action 
Service with the European Commission or the Council of European Union. 
Regardless the comprehensive crisis management, founding the basic principles in 
the European Security Strategy of pre-crisis management, such as preventive 
engagement, the main target of the European Security and Action Service 
competence is based on the improvement of soft-power policies. The crisis 
management is thus considered as a complex system of prevention, responsive and 
post-crisis management. Recently, the EU has already adopted its institutional 
mechanism towards a goal of resilience crisis management. Concerning the future 
development, found on the historical progress, the strengthening the pre-crisis 
management tools would continue till the European Union would like to 
demonstrate its regional and international role in world politics.  
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